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Book Reviews 
sion "closes deconstruction off from mindless charges of nihilism and subjectiv- 
ism" even as it "closes religion off from mindless fundamentalism" (p. 279). Any- 
one today who would persist in claiming that Derrida has no significance for 
religion-or religion for Derrida-can do so only by ignoring this complex, pro- 
vocative, and masterful work. 
THOMAS A. CARLSON, University of California, Santa Barbara. 
MORRISON, ROBERT G. Nietzsche and Buddhism: A Study in Nihilism and Ironic Affini- 
ties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 250 pp. $62.00 (cloth). 
Any mention of Nietzsche necessarily raises the question of which Nietzsche one 
has in mind. In recent years, French deconstructionists have awarded him post- 
humous admission to the Academie Franpaise. Jaspers and then Kaufmann taught 
an earlier generation to think of him as a prophet of existentialism. Robert Mor- 
rison has made Nietzsche recognizable once again as a German Romantic. More 
precisely, Morrison presents Nietzsche as a kind of romantic guru: a teacher inter- 
ested in spiritual practice. Curiously, Morrison's return to Nietzsche's romanticism 
is made possible by rereading him using Pali Buddhist thought. Morrison's read- 
ing of Nietzsche is all the more intriguing when we note that Nietzsche himself 
not only predicted the West's current interest in Buddhism, but he was ready with 
a harsh dismissal of it. With the death of God, a weakened and degraded bour- 
geoisie will be attracted to Buddhism's nihilism and passivity. Western dalliance 
with Buddhism should be seen as a symptom of a cultural disease. For Nietzsche, 
Buddhism's nihilism and passivity must be overcome by means of the will to 
power. 
In Morrison's view, Nietzsche was wrong about Buddhism as a form of passive 
nihilism. In fact, Buddhism and Nietzsche bear "ironic affinities" with one an- 
other. To highlight these affinities, Morrison provides his readers with close tex- 
tual comparisons bringing together a multitude of Nietzsche's works with texts 
taken from the Pali Buddhist canon. Morrison's attention is focused almost exclu- 
sively on the correspondences between Nietzsche's ideas regarding will to power 
and self-overcoming (Selbstiiberwindung) and the Buddhist notions of desire 
(tanha) and mind cultivation (citta-bhdvand). 
In a godless universe, a world without any transcendent basis for values, new 
values must be established through the assertion of will. Nietzsche's notion of 
will, in Morrison's reading, is similar to early Buddhist teachings regarding the 
transformation of tanha. Rightly understood, the goal of Buddhist spiritual prac- 
tice is not to annihilate desire. Buddhism seeks the transformation of desire from 
egocentric clinging to compassionate action. Tanha can thus be either skillful or 
unskillful. This distinction is central to Morrison's retrieval of Nietzsche. Like 
tanha, will to power can also be either skillful or unskillful. Skillful will to power 
leads to self-overcoming and the rise of the Ubermensch. Morrison also finds affin- 
ities between Nietzsche's demand for self-overcoming (Selbstiiberwindung) and Pali 
Buddhism's notion of mind cultivation (citta-bhdvand). For both Pali Buddhism 
and Nietzsche, the human being is a welter of conflicting wills struggling for su- 
premacy. The Ubermensch arises in the establishment of a higher quantum of 
power by means of the overcoming of lower drives. Morrison makes connections 
with Pali Buddhist traditions regarding the cultivation of mind through spiri- 
tual practice. 
Morrison's is not the first effort at comparing Buddhism to Nietzsche. The 
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relationship between the two, however, can vary considerably depending on what 
side of the Pacific one is working from. Japanese interpreters of Nietzsche and 
Buddhism, such as Nishitani Keiji, in his The Self Overcoming Nihilism (Albany, 
N.Y., 1990), and Abe Masao in his various essays on Nietzsche, offer their own 
critiques of the West. If Nietzsche thought of Buddhism as symptomatic of the 
disease of nihilism, these Japanese thinkers return the compliment in kind, only 
now Nietzsche is symptomatic of the disease and Buddhism is held up as the cure. 
Contrary to Nishitani and Abe, Morrison would make of Nietzsche a latter-day 
practitioner of the Dharma by reading Buddhism as a kind of Nietzschean call to 
will to power. Morrison ends several of his later chapters with the observation 
that Nietzsche, had he the benefit of a more critical understanding of early Bud- 
dhism, could have learned much from its practical experience in spiritual prac- 
tice. The book even concludes with the suggestion that we might think of the 
historical Buddha as a kind of Ubermensch. 
Did Siddhartha Gautama really preach a form of the will to power? One of 
Morrison's many virtues is that he does not ask his readers to accept this conclu- 
sion without benefit of a carefully argued and critical treatment of the texts in 
question. He also provides an evaluation of the materials on Buddhism available 
to Nietzsche, even speculation on the import of Oldenberg's mistranslations of 
early Pali texts. An affinity, no matter how ironic, does not a difference make. The 
affinities Morrison traces between Nietzsche and Pali Buddhism allow him to read 
both Nietzsche and Buddhism in unusual ways. The same, I believe, can be said 
for the differences that distinguish the two. If will to power can be construed as 
a form of skillful desire (tanha), should not compassion (karuna) be recognized 
as a Buddhist form of ressentiment? Should this prove to be the case, the historical 
Buddha would be a far cry from Nietzsche's Ubermensch. 
JAMES L. FREDERICKS, Loyola Marymount University. 
FENN, RICHARD K. The Persistence of Purgatory. New York and Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1995. viii+209 pp. $49.95 (cloth); $16.95 (paper). 
The doctrine of purgatory is one of those wonderful excrescences of the Christian 
imagination. It has only the slimmest authorization in scripture, but it is a story 
the very absence of which hollered out its need to be told in some form of mid- 
rash. Origen speculated about it, the thirteenth-century Council of Lyons estab- 
lished it as doctrine, Dante conjured it into an enduring alpine geography of the 
soul, and the Council of Trent reaffirmed it in the face of its Protestant detractors. 
Richard Fenn has written a book that is not about any of these wondrous details 
but is every bit as good. Instead, he wants to know what became of purgatory as 
Western societies relinquished it. His argument is that purgatory persists in our 
conception of time and has, through moralizing our temporal consciousness, 
given rise to the modern notion of the self. 
In its classic form purgatory was, first, an ordeal that transpired in the afterlife, 
a realm that shared the same "time zone" as life on earth. Sins were measurable 
there in terms of time-each sin had units of time corresponding to it. Second, 
purgatory was a way of describing transactions between the living and the dead. 
The living had obligations to the dead to say prayers and make offerings on their 
behalf in order to ease their torments and to relieve them of time they had ahead 
of them in purgatory. Third, time was itself counting down to an end. At the end 
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